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Why do House Martins Delichon urbicum prefer stinking
old mud nests over clean strong artificial nests made of
wood-concrete? Why do they choose the very nests that
carry a load of louse fly Crataerina hirundinis pupae,
parasites which as soon as they feel the warmth of
returning martins will develop into serious blood-
sucking monsters (Summers 1975, Piersma 2013)?
One could answer this question by suggesting that
over the last few million years all ancestors of house
martins have been using mud nests and that other nest
types are simply not an option. One might hypothesize
that during their development, young House Martins
have learned to live in and love mud nests, so of course
they will choose those over others, even if these alter-
natives are strong and clean. Perhaps House Martins
love old mud nests because their presence signals a site
where House Martins nested successfully in previous
years; or perhaps the blood-sucking louse flies actually
provide a benefit that we are unaware of? One could
also suggest that the sight of an old mud nest (but not
an artificial nest) makes the martins release the flush of
love hormones necessary to prepare for mating and
reproduction. Right. At this point, you will probably
have recognized the four types of questions about
animal behaviour distinguished for ‘pragmatic’ reasons
by Niko Tinbergen (1963): on phylogeny, on develop-
ment, on function and on mechanism. It is widely
recognized that one should be clear about the kind of
question (about a particular phenomenon) addressed
in an idea or hypothesis, because without such struc-
turing, the thinking is likely to be confused and argu-
ments will never be settled.
Niko Tinbergen (1907–1988) was not the first
‘Dutchman’ to seek structure in the logic of asking ques-
tions (Tinbergen was born, raised and educated in The
Netherlands, but moved, after an appointment in
1939–1947 at Leiden University, voluntarily resigning
during the German occupation from 1942–1945, to the
UK to become the professor of ethology at Oxford
University; see Bolhuis & Verhulst 2009). Baruch de
Spinoza (1632–1677), the Amsterdam-born son of
Portuguese Jews seeking safety in The Netherlands
from the Spanish inquisition, was somebody interested
in structured thinking at a time when religion, and the
particular social cocoons that religions resulted in,
confined free-thinking. Importantly, Spinoza lived at a
time when empirical knowledge was valued much less
than logical reasoning; very often, life was simply too
short to build-up empirical knowledge.
From his first work, “De verbetering van het
verstand”, or “The improvement of the understanding”
(de Spinoza 1677, Curley 1985), onwards, Spinoza
developed a structure to think, a structure that obvi-
ously reflected the range of ideas available to him at
the time. During his own short and sober life, he prac-
ticed this structured logical thinking very systematically
(Schuyt 2017). He thought about the relationships
between rational thinking and emotions, about self-
interest and solidarity, and about personal and political
freedom. Perhaps most critically, Spinoza thought that
knowledge increases gradually, with nature only
yielding its secrets little by little. The statue of Spinoza
in Amsterdam made by Nicolas Dings (2008) shows
House Sparrows Passer domesticus and Rose-ringed
Parakeets Psittacula krameri in his mantle. This does
not refer to any interest in ornithology. In Spinoza’s
time birds symbolized the free word. In the statue Ring-
necked Parakeets, exotic newcomers to Amsterdam,
symbolize tolerance; house sparrows stand for the
decline of biodiversity.
Niko Tinbergen did most of his studies on birds and
was probably not directly inspired by Baruch de
Spinoza’s attempts to improve the logic of thought.
However, his own advice on the aims and methods of
the study of behaviour, with the recognition of four
types of questions, certainly inspired and guided a
whole generation of ethologists. Also in the early 1960s,
Ernst Mayr, again an ornithologist, wrote a review with
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a rather similar if somewhat expanded scope (Mayr
1961). In this paper Mayr created a distinction between
‘functional biology’ (the ‘plumbing’ of organisms,
regarding DNA as the code of life, ‘how’) and ‘evolu-
tionary biology’ (the study of organismal evolution at
various time scales, ‘why’). Note that in this dichotomy
‘functional’ is totally different from Tinbergen’s use of
the word; Tinbergen would say that functional biolo-
gists are interested in ‘mechanisms'. However great the
heuristic value of a distinction between the ‘how’ and
‘why’ questions may have been, according to Laland et
al. (2011) it now hampers progress in biology. This is
because the dichotomy fails to recognize the many
feedbacks between traits, environments and gene
expression, i.e. that the plumbing and evolution of
organisms and their environments are so deeply (and
so confusingly) intertwined. These are the dependen-
cies that we now need to understand.
In his opus magnum “The study of behaviour.
Organization, methods, and principles”, Jerry Hogan
(2017) recognizes the reciprocal feedbacks operating in
nature. At the base of his arguments lies his conviction
that cause and function are separate questions that
both need to be answered (Hogan 2009). Also, whereas
Tinbergen (1963) merged them in the category of
mechanistic questions, for Hogan ‘cause’ and ‘mecha-
nism’ are actually two distinct concepts. Mechanism is a
structural concept: how does it work? How are the
parts of the corporeal mechanism organized? Cause is
what activates the mechanism. What sets the mecha-
nism into action?
It can be argued that all questions about a behav-
iour like the House Martins’ preference for old mud
nests eventually boil down to questions about the
history of that behaviour (Sapolsky 2017, Oudman &
Piersma 2018). Hogan (2017) acknowledges this, but
nevertheless chose to categorize the types of questions
as an aid to systematic logical thinking (Table 1). He
systemizes his three ‘Aristotelian’ questions with respect
to ‘time’ (current behaviour, ontogeny/individual
development, and phylogeny/evolutionary history).
The three basic questions, let’s say about a wooden
chair, are about ‘structure’ (Aristotle’s formal cause: the
chair has four legs, a seat and a back arranged in some
special way), about ‘causation’ (Aristotle’s efficient
cause: the chair has been manufactured in this way by
somebody) and ‘consequence’ (Aristotle’s final cause:
the chair has been made to sit comfortably). The frame-
work encompasses Tinbergen’s four questions, i.e. the
one on phylogeny (questions on structure and causa-
tion under phylogeny, Table 1), on development (all
three questions under ontogeny), on function (ques-
tions on consequence under phylogeny) and on mecha-
nism (all three questions under current behaviour).
TIME SCALE ‘ARISTOTELIAN’  
CATEGORIZATION
OF QUESTIONS current behaviour ontogeny phylogeny
structure What types of clay are used, In which ways does the ‘neural How is the preference for old   
and how many clay-balls does and hormonal wiring’ in mud nests and the association
a mud nest comprise? What House Martins change as with louse flies distributed
are the perceptual, processing maturing individuals develop over the extant relatives of
and motor mechanisms the capacity to recognize and House Martins and their
involved in the repair to build and repair mud nests? inferred ancestors?
or building of mud nests?
causation What are the internal and Is the preference for old mud Was the use of old mud nests     
external triggers that motivate nests, and the repair of them, always selected for in the past,
House Martins to repair or ‘prefunctional’? What genes are or only under particular
build a mud nest? On what expressed during the building of environmental circumstances?
basis do they recognize mud nests and does this differ
the right clay types? between environmental contexts?
consequence During which times of year and Is the inspection of empty Do House Martins using old     
day do House Martins build nests and nest remains mud nests, or nests with more
mud nests? Does a martin by fledglings important louse flies, have higher fitness?
feel happy after rebuilding in this learning process?
a damaged old mud nest?
Table 1. A framework of the nine types of questions about behaviour as organized by Jerry Hogan (2017), and as it can be applied to
the preference for old and self-(re)built mud nests by House Martins (a variety of questions are stated in italics).        
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We can now go back to the seemingly odd prefer-
ence of House Martins for old and self-(re)built mud
nests stuffed with parasites, and freely ask questions
about them (Table 1). The categorization of some of
them helped me to begin understand the logic of
thinking about birds as mastered by Hogan. As I pieced
together Table 1, I came to realize that most of main-
stream ornithology is devoted to only one out of nine of
Hogan’s categories. We mostly seem to publish on ques-
tions about what Hogan calls ‘the consequence of
behavioural phylogeny’. When we ask ‘why’, we ask
about the function of a behaviour in terms of survival
value and fitness benefits. Are the functional questions
the easiest to answer? Or has it become time to expand
our questioning minds?
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